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Abstract Previously, in underdeveloped countries, people tried to keep the
prices of food products artificially low, in order to help the poor to buy their
food. But it became soon clear that such system, although helpful for the
city poor, was disastrous for the peasants (who usually are even poorer), so
that hunger increased, instead of decreasing. More recently, thus, higher prices
have been imposed. But a high-price system does not solve the problems.
It helps, indeed, a peasant to buy in the city non-edible products, but not
to buy (more expensive) food products from other peasants. The question
is discussed here in more detail starting from the simplest conceivable case
of two peasants producing each a different food product (bread and cheese,
say), then generalizing to several food items and to any number of peasants
producing a given food item j. Like in every economic system which wants
to be sustainable, or able to reproduce itself in a stationary state at least,
prices are determined by the necessity of exchanging “means of production”
among “industries”, except that here “industries” are replaced by working
peasants and “means of production” are replaced by food. It is found that
prices must obey certain inequalities related to the minimal amount of each
food item necessary for survival. Inequalities may be rewritten as equations
and, in an important special case, such equations give rise to a simple version
of the matrix equation used by famous authors to describe the economy.
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1 Introduction
Previously, in underdeveloped countries, the governments tried to keep food
prices artificially low, in order to help the poor to buy their food. But it became
soon clear that such system, although helpful for the city poor, was disastrous
for the peasants (who usually are even poorer), so that hunger increased,
rather than decreasing. More recently, thus, higher prices have been imposed.
But food prices non-uniformly higher, besides the possible disadvantage of the
city poor, do not solve the problems. They help, indeed, a peasant to buy in
the city non-edible products, but does not help him at all to buy food products
from some other peasants, if such products have become more expensive.
In general exogenously fixed prices 1 must satisfy some constraints to allow
the economy to stay alive. Further, if they are far from the “natural prices” (to
be defined below)[1], they induce unfairness among individuals, and instability
among sectors, possibly to be suppressed by authority. The question will be
discussed in more detail starting with simple examples.
2 Two peasants
Let us suppose, to begin with, two food products to be needed in order to
survive, bread and cheese, say. Let 1 be the farmer producing the cereals from
which bread is made, 2 the shepherd raising the sheep from whose milk cheese
is made.
The monetary income of 1, R1, must be spent to buy cheese. The inequality
R1 ≥ p2F2 (1)
holds, where p2 is the price of cheese and F2 is the minimal amount of cheese
needed for survival.
On the other hand, how does 1 obtain his income R1? Selling bread. If he
produces the amount Q1 of bread, he eats at least F1 with his family and sells
V1:
Q1 ≥ F1 + V1 (2)
and, if p1 is the price of bread, his income is
R1 = p1V1 (3)
Therefore
R1 ≤ p1(Q1 − F1) (4)
From (1) and (4) the inequality
1 Suppose e.g a government agency buying from producers and selling them what they
need at fixed prices
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p2F2 ≤ p1(Q1 − F1) (5)
obtains, i.e.
p2/p1 ≤ (Q1 − F1)/F2 (6)
(survival of the farmer).
But a similar reasoning, considering the shepherd instead of the farmer,
yields the inequality
p1/p2 ≤ (Q2 − F2)/F1 (7)
or
p2/p1 ≥ F1/(Q2 − F2) (8)
(survival of the shepherd). (6) and (8) are compatible (i.e. a price system
exists under which both farmer and shepherd can live) only if
F1/(Q2 − F2) ≤ (Q1 − F1)/F2 (9)
which implies
F1/Q1 + F2/Q2 ≤ 1. (10)
This seems to be an interesting conclusion; in fact, it is rather trivial. Both
Q1/F1 and Q2/F2 must always be larger than (or equal to) 2. If the size of
the population is 2,
Qi ≥ 2Fi, i = 1, 2. (11)
A sizable production, thus, is required in each sector. E.g. if the farmer
produces the amount of bread needed for the survival of both, then the shep-
herd must do the same for cheese. But if e.g. both have an overproduction of
50% only, there is no hope: with any price system, one of the two succumbs.
The really interesting conclusions are (6) and (8), which may be written
together:
F1/(Q2 − F2) ≤ p2/p1 ≤ (Q1 − F1)/F2 (12)
yielding the admissible range of prices.
If e.g. Q2 = 2F2 and Q1 = 3F1, (12) implies 1 ≤ p2F2/p1F1 ≤ 2.In this
interval both survive. On the countrary if the price of the cheese dose falls
below that of the bread dose, the shepherd must draw on his savings (if and
as long as possible) to buy bread, or reduce the self-consumption F2 or F1;
both choices are unsustainable. .
Moreover, assuming the limiting value p2F2/p1F1 = 1, the shepherd can
just survive, while the farmer can save (or extra consume) a dose of bread,
or spend the saved value p1F1 elsewhere. An exogenous price policy might
produce deep inequalities in the population.
(12) imply also
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p1F1 + p2F2 ≤ p1Q1 (13)
(and similarly for p2Q2). The meaning of (13) is commonsensical: the final
revenue has not to be lower than the costs of production. It will become clearer
below (see discussion after eq. (19)).
3 Many peasants, several sectors
It is now easy to generalize to more than two food products (but the food
products necessary for survival are in all cases very few). It is also convenient
to deal with sectors rather than with single peasants: this language shift is
clearly allowed.
Let Ni the number of peasants of the i-sector (i.e., producing the food
product i), while N =
∑
iNi will be the total number of peasants of all
sectors, the fraction of i-peasants being ni = Ni/N . Then (1) is replaced by
Ri ≥ Ni
∑
j 6=i
pjFj (14)
and (2) and (4) are replaced respectively by
Qi ≥ NiFi + Vi (15)
and by
Ri ≤ pi(Qi −NiFi). (16)
Taking together (14) with (16)∑
j 6=i
(pj/pi)Fj ≤ Qi/(Ni − Fi) (17)
i.e. ∑
j
(pj/pi)Fj ≤ Qi/Ni (18)
or
Ni
∑
j
pjFj ≤ piQi. (19)
The inequality (19) establishes an acceptable price system, since∑
j
pjFj = M (20)
denotes the cost of production per worker. Thus (19) says that the cost of
production of any sector cannot overcome its final revenue. We can normalize
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the common factor of prices by posing e.g. pi = 1, or in this special case
(wherein the cost of production per worker M is the same for all sectors)
posingM = 1, so that all prices would be relative to the ”numeraire” arbitrary
chosen. But we postpone this kind of choice, and we mantain not normalized
prices .
We have two basic inequalities for each i. First of all the ”technical” con-
dition
Qi ≥ NFi (21)
must hold, implying that any food product i is produced sufficiently for every-
body, assuming all people to have the same needs. (This equation generalizes
(11)). The second basic inequalities is, from (19),(20),
pi ≥ MNi/Qi (22)
.
4 Equalities
The inequalities (21) and (19) may be written as equalities. Assuming that
there is a surplus Yi = NFisi ≥ 0 of food item j, we rewrite (21) as
Qi = NFi + Yi = NFi(1 + si) (23)
Similarly, we rewrite (19) as
Nj
Qj
(∑
i
piFi
)
≤ pj . (24)
that is, posing
Aij = Fi
Nj
Qj
, (25)
∑
i piAij ≤ pj follows,and finally, introducing rj ≥ 0,∑
i
piAij(1 + rj) = pj (26)
Equation (26), except for the presence of different rj ’s, has a form sim-
ilar to equations well known in the economic literature[1,2]. Typically, such
equations describe the production of industries of each sector using inputs
from industries of other sectors; in this case rj is the ”rate of profit” of the j-
sector. Although in the present case of poor peasants the word ”profit” sounds
improper, or even ironical, it is true that the well-being of the different sec-
tors depends precisely on the value of their rj , and that, if for the j-sector
rj happens to become negative, then the j-sector is destroyed, the peasants
of that sector can no longer survive, and the whole system is at risk. In the
case of exogenous prices, provided they are consistent with inequalities( 19),
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the set of equations (26) can be solved for the ris, which are different among
sectors. Given that the prices are exogenous, (26) can be solved for all ri, ad
the solution is
ri =
pi −
Ni
Qi
M
Ni
Qi
M
, (27)
where Ni
Qi
is the cost of production per j−unit of food.
A general formula relates the rates of profit ri with the surplus production
realized in the different sectors:
∑
i
ni
1 + ri
1 + si
= 1. (28)
Proof of (28). Using (25), eq. (26) may be written
Ni
Qi
(1 + ri)
∑
j
pjFj = pi (29)
But
∑
j pjFj =M , and Qi = NFi(1 + si), hence (using ni = Ni/N)
ni
Fi
1 + ri
1 + si
M = pi. (30)
Multiplying by Fi and summing over i, we find again
∑
j pjFj = M at the
right-hand side, and (28) is found. Equation (28), which can be rewritten
usefully also as ∑
i
NiFi
Qi
(1 + ri) = 1 (31)
is a pure macroeconomical constraint, which connects physical magnitudes
and economical decisions. In fact, given (27), to fix exogenous rates of profit is
tantamount to fix exogenous prices. From (28), given the non-negativity of ri
and the trivial
∑
i ni = 1, we see that in the limiting case of all si = 0 (that is a
purely self-reproducible system, no surplus) all ri are null, and then, via (27),
the sole possible prices are fixed, i.e. pi =
Ni
Qi
. In words, if the surplus vanishes,
and the whole gross product is necessary to the reproduction of the system,
there is no room for any policy of exogenous prices if the system has to stay
alive. Note that only in the case of two sectors (see (12)) relative prices have
both a lower and an upper bound, fixed by the actual physical production. In
the case of many sectors the disequations (24) and (22) furnish only a lower
bound for each price. The importance of (28) or (31) is due to the implicit
double bound which prices have to respect for the system staying alive.
A possible exogenous price fixing, suggested by the simple form (28), is to
put ri = si. This position would reward sectors endowed by a large surplus,
and would punish less productive ones. This policy cannot but be a temporary
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measure, as it would produce a bias for peasants abandoning sectors worth of
a larger production towards sectors which have no need to increase2.
For example, take n1 = 2/3, n2 = 1/3, s1 = 1/2, s2 = 1/4. Then, according
to Section 1, the inequalities were 4/11 ≤ p2F2/(p1F1) ≤ 5/4, The prices
induced by (28) with ri = si are p2F2/(p1F1) = 1/2..
Another limit situation (see the next Section) is that of a policy that
would impose a uniform rates of profit for all sectors, but this would be indis-
tiguishable from a system left to itself and so ”naturally” driven to equal-
ize different rates of profit. In this situation, with the above parameters,
p2F2/(p1F1) = 3/5
5 A single rate of profit
Economic theory [1,2,4],involves equations describing how industries of a given
sector use, for their production processes, commodities obtained from indus-
tries of other sectors. In some cases such equations have the general form∑
i
piAij(1 + r) = pj . (32)
They are a system of linear equations whose unknowns are the n prices (the
number of sectors) and the (unique) rate of profit, and Aij are known produc-
tion coefficients. This is a homogeneous system, and prices are determined up
to an arbitrary common factor. Actually, the system is usually more compli-
cated than this, because it involves explicitly the competition for the resources
between capital and labour, which coincide in our simple pure labour economy
[3]. In our case of a simple pure labour economy, the means of production are
nothing else than the survival feeding of workers.
Our equation (32) seems to belong to this class, although the matrix Aij
(see 25) is very simple, each entry being the product of Fi (the i−dose of
food) times Nj/Qj, the labour for a unit of product of the j−sector. Or more
materialistically: NjFi is the quantity of i−commodity necessary to produce
Qj . Given that the price (of a commodity) is always implicitly referred to the
unit (of that commodity), piAij = piFi
Nj
Qj
is the contribution of the value of
the i−commodity to the cost of a unity of the j−commodity.
Aij = Fiaj , (33)
aj = Nj/Qj, (34)
where aj is the coefficient of labour of the j−sector, that is the quantity of
labour per j−unit (its reciprocal hj is the j−productivity ). Note that the
role of prices is quite different here: in (32) they are endogenous, and can
2 It is well known that an expanding economy the rate of growth is large as the minimum
surplus rate of its basic sectors. See[2].
.
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be obtained (up to a scale factor) together with the (single) rate of profit
r, while in (26) we had different rates of profit rj for the different sectors.
If prices are fixed exogenously, and the rates of profit in the different sectors
are considerably different, the temptation for the individuals to pass to sectors
with high rate of profit is strong, but it is constrained by the vinculum (23). In
words, sectors with low profit are compelled to be populated, in order to keep
alive the economic system; a sort of serfdom. Instead if prices are endogenous
and they are obtained by (32) together with the single rate of profit, there
is no reason for change of sector, and the economy would be in a ”natural”
equilibrium.
Due to the simplicity of our matrix, (32) can be solved exacty for the n
prices and the rate of profit r, as the actual variables are only n − 1 relative
prices and r. Considering (32) with Aij from ( 33 ) we have
Nj
Qj
(
∑
i
piFi)(1 + r) = pj , j = 1, .., n (35)
which implies
pj = V
Nj
Qj
= V aj (36)
If we put the constant V = 1, i.e
pj =
Nj
Qj
(37)
prices are measured as the values produced by the work of the peasants in a
given time t (for example a day, a year). If Qi is the amount of food of type
j produced in time t, and
Nj
Qj
is the amount of labour needed to produce a
j−unit, then prices are equal to ”values”(in the sense of the classical school
of economics).3
Substituting (37) in equations (35) we obtain
1
1 + r
=
∑
i
piFi =
∑
i
Ni
Qi
Fi (39)
Note that, due to (21),
∑
i
Ni
Qi
Fi ≤
∑
i
Ni
N
= 1, and r ≥ 0
Hence
r =
1∑
i aiFi
− 1. (40)
3 From (23),
NiFi
Qi
=
ni
1 + si
(38)
It is interesting and correct (although at first sight unexpected) the fact that the price of
the i-dose is proportional to ni = Ni/N : peasants belonging to big sectors must obtain a
relatively high price for food doses produced by them. This is due to the fact that they must
first of all feed themselves and their families and, if they are many, the few doses left to be
sold must be exchanged with the many doses of the other commodities they need to survive.
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Prices are proportional to
Nj
Qj
= aj, i.e the labour, whereas up to here
peasants appeared only via the food they need to survive. This food appears
as capital to be anticipated, and the surplus is shared among sectors propor-
tionally to the capital. But in a pure labour economy the capital is the ”slave
wage” only, which is proportional to the number of workers. In the following
we will assume endogenous (”natural”) prices and accordingly a single rate of
profit r. A more formal approach to ”natural prices economy” is given in the
following Chapter.
6 Matrix approach
In order to introduce the matrix approach, we turn to the mathematical form
of eq. (32), which is attractive from a theoretical point of view. Eq. (32) is an
eigenvalue equation, to which all the corresponding theorems can be applied.
It can be written in symbolic form as
p ·A(1 + r) = p. (41)
where p = (p1, ...., pn) is a row vector with as many components as the
number of commodities; A is a n × n matrix whose entries are the technical
coefficients (quantity of i needed for a unit of j); and r ≥ 0 is the rate of profit.
In (41) A is given, so that we have n+ 1 unknowns. But due to homogeneity,
a price can be fixed at will, say p1 = 1 (the numeraire, so that all the other
prices become relative), and the system has a unique solution: the ”natural
price” p, is the left eigenvector of A corresponding to the eigenvalue λ =
1/(1+ r). Actually, by the Perron-Frobenius theorem (see Appendix of [2]), λ
is the maximum eigenvalue, it is not greater than 1, and it is the sole whose
eigenvector eigenvector has all elements positive. Further in our simple case
the matrix factorizes, and it can be made even simpler taking as units the
individual survival doses of each commodity. In this case we intoduce Xi =
Qi/Fi, whose the meaning is the number of individual doses, and Aij =
Nj
Xj
,
the reciprocal of the product number per capita
Xj
Nj
. Thus
A =


N1
X1
N2
X2
... Nn
Xn
N1
X1
N2
X2
... Nn
Xn
... ... ... ...
N1
X1
N2
X2
... Nn
Xn


all rows being equal (hence its determinant vanishes, but this is irrelevant in
the present treatment). The maximum eigenvalue is (the capital R indicates
the maximum value of r)
λ =
∑
i
ai =
∑
i
Ni/Xi ≤ 1 (42)
(see Sct. 5), where ai = Ni/Xi is the coefficient of labour of the j−sector,
that is the quantity of labour per j−unit (its reciprocal is a measure of the
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productivity ). The corresponding left eigenvalue p is proportional to a =
(a1, ...., an), and the maximum profit rate is
R =
1∑
i ai
− 1. (43)
We have commented in Sct. 5 that the fact that the ”natural price” is
proportional to the labour necessary to produce one unit (one dose, from now
on) looks strange in a scheme where all surplus is attributed to profit and
nothing to labour. In facts the complete form of (41) would be:
p ·A(1 + r) + aw = p. (44)
where a is the labour coefficient row vector, and w is the price of a unit of
labour (the ”human part” of labour, which exceeds pure subsistence). Given
that p ·A is the value of the means of production, the value of the surplus
p− p ·A is divided into a capital part (p ·A) r and a labour part aw.The
opposite of (41) is
p ·A+ aw = p. (45)
where all surplus is allocated to labour. The formal solution of (45) is
p = a · (I−A)
−1
w.. (46)
(46) says that prices are not simply proportional to a, but they are proportional
to the vertically integrated labour coefficients a · (I−A)
−1
, a notion whose
detailed description we can now afford to omit 4. This because fortunately the
two notions are in turn proportional if a is a letf eigenvector of A, which is the
basic property of a pure labour economy5; hence p = V a. We can conclude
that in a pure labor economy prices are independent of the distribution of
the net product, and that sector shares of the surplus are the same, either
proportional to the invested ”capital” or to labour.
4 This notion is fundamental in many works of L.Pasinetti (see e.g.[3], pag.75). The sym-
bolic formulation of the system of quantities is A ·Q+Y = Q,where Q and Y are column
vectors representing the n quantities and surpluses. Then (I− A) ·Q = Y, and Q =(I−
A)−1·Y.
The elements of the non-negative matrix (I− A)−1(which exists being I− A non sin-
gular) represent the physical quantities i nedeed, directly or indirectly, to obtain a unit
of j−commodity as surplus. This can be realized using the identity (I− A)−1 = I+
A+A2 + .. + Ak + ..., where each term adds the mean of production necessary to the
previous stage
Then a·(I− A)−1 represents the quantity of labour used, directly or indirectly, to obtain a
physical unit of any commodity.
5 This remains true at any level of r and w in the general form (44). In the whole treatise
we suppose that sectors have no master, i.e. the final product belongs to workers, who
collectively anticipate the means of production and share the net product. If so there is no
difference is they ”think” themselves as capitalists or workers or any mixture of two. If there
were masters, though prices would not change, peasants’ welfare would be proportonial to
w
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7 Exchanges with the city
So far we have supposed that the countryside economy is a pure labour econ-
omy, where there is no room for non-edible goods. If one wants to introduce
”luxury goods” as consumptions available to country people, one has to in-
troduce the sector to produce them. Coming back to the simple example of
Chapter 2, besides the farmer and the shepherd we introduce a carpet seller,
who, to produce X3 carpets, needs bread, cheese and a fraction of his product.
The first observation is that the contryside can have access to ”luxury goods”
only if the country surplus is enough to substain one more worker, i.e. Xi ≥ 3,
see (11). To avoid inessential complications we consider the added value all
given to profit (we have treated the peasants as little interpreneurs, having
used for them the reduced form (41). The new system of linear equations is
the following, with r = R

(p1 + p2)(1 +R) = p1X1
(p1 + p2) (1 +R) = p2X2
(p1 + p2 + p3) (1 +R) = p3X3
(47)
The different role of the third equation with respect to the previous two is
apparent. The first two equations are unchanged with respect to the old closed
system, they can be solved analytically, and the solution is just the old one. If
we put the system (47) in matrix form,
A =


1
X1
1
X2
1
X3
1
X1
1
X2
1
X3
0 0 1
X3

 , (48)
we see that the matrix is reducible, and the main submatrix (describing the
basic-commodities) is identical to the closed system. Posing p1 = 1, i.e. mea-
suring values in terms of a dose of bread, we get p2 =
X1
X2
. (See the note to the
previous chapter). The rate of profit R is
R =
1
X−11 +X
−1
2
− 1 (49)
, whereX−11 +X
−1
2 is the maximum eigenvalue of the main submatrix (see(??))..
All these variables being determined in the the main submatrix (describing
the basic-commodities), turning to the third equation we find
p3 =
X1
X3 − 1−R
, (50)
and the system is completely solved. Note that (50) must be taken with care:
we see that X3, or rather X3 − 1, must be large, i.e. the production which
exceeds its means, must be larger than R, to avoid strange behaviour of p3[1]
We can consider the effect on the countrymen of enlarging the economy to
comprehend the carpet seller. Neither the prices did change, nor the income of
each sector, that is RM, i.e. the maximum rate of profit times the value of the
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individual means of production. The sole advantage is given by the possibility
of owing carpets, besides bread and cheese, as commodities to be consumed.
For city workers there is the possibility of being sustained by the country food,
which they exchange with carpets.
Instead for the city sector also the price depends esplicitely on the rate of
profit, and this can be critical, due to the denominator of (50).
Suppose that X3 − 1 − R is small. The city sector is fragile, ruled by
(p1 + p2 + p3) (1 + R) = p3X3, Its fragility is due to the fact that, at odds
with basic-commodities cases, p1, p2 and R are given exogenously from the
point of view of the city. Otherways p3 has no limit, as it does not affect
any other price. For all basic equations piXi > pi(1 + R) holds by definition,
because R is endogenously derived. But in case of a non-basic commodity, it
may happen that p3X3 < p3(1+R) , being R exogenous. If X3−1−R is small
and positive, i.e. the production is small, the price can grow without limit to
support the exchange with country commodities, to pay wages and retain a
”fair” profit. But in case of p3X3 < p3(1 +R), even an infinite price is unable
to satisfy the equation, as the total revenue is less than the sole ”fair” profit.
6
7.0.1 Productivity changes induced by exchanges with the city.
The contact with the city is not only a chance for new types of expenditures:
it may induce the desire to improve one’s technical ability, or to better culti-
vation methods, like a farmer buying a plough. Starting from equations (44),
we do not introduce new means of production: we simply suppose that the
farmer increases its productivity, while the shepherd mantains its technical
coefficients.
A first way to express the improved productivity is that of supposing the
farmer producing simply more bread, ceteris paribus. Instead of (52) we can
write.
(p1 + p2)(1 +R) = γp1X1, 1 ≤ γ
(p1 + p2) (1 +R) = p2X2.
(51)
The augmented production of bread changes the technical matrix, its eigen-
system and R, but in a simple way. p2 =
γX1
X2
grows linearly with γ, and the
total income too, i.e. γX1 − 2 +
γX1
X2
(X2 − 2) = 2γ(X1 −
X1
X2
) − 2, and it is
partitioned into two equal parts, since the means of productions are equal in
the two sectors. The technological improvement of the farmer betters (eco-
nomically at least) both sectors, and the increasing income can support some
other development.
In the second case we suppose that the farmer produces the same previ-
ous amount working less (due to his increased productivity), i.e., using the
complete form derived from (44)
6 This example is discussed at some lemgth in [1].
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(p1 + p2)(1 + r) + gw = p1X1, 0 ≤ g ≤ 1
(p1 + p2) (1 + r) + w = p2X2
(52)
The submatrix (48) is unchanged, thus eigenvalues and eigenvectors do not
change, the maximum rate of profit is still (49). What changes is the labour
coefficient vector, which is not a left eigenvector of the technical matrix unless
g = 1. Hence we expect that natural prices depend on r. But if we consider
r = R and w = 0 the dependence on g disappears, and all economical values
are the same. In this case the farmer can benefit of the improved quality of
life without any economical loss.
A third case of interaction with the city can be represented by the en-
largement of the two country sectors to comprehend a sector which produces
iron objects (like ploughs, spades,,,.), useful for improving the technique of the
farmer. At odds with luxury goods, let us suppose that the new technique of
the farmer needs a dose of iron, useless to the shepherd, while the iron worker
needs bread, cheese and one dose of iron. We suppose that the production of
bread increases, and that of cheese is the same, The equations are:

(p1 + p2 + p3)(1 +R) = p1X1
(p1 + p2) (1 +R) = p2X2
(p1 + p2 + p3) (1 +R) = p3X3
(53)
Different from the case of luxury goods (47), now the third price is essential
for the price of bread, so that the countryside is not independent from the city
sector. In this elementary case we can solve the system:

p1 = 1
p3 = X1/X3
p2 =
X1(X3−1−R)
X2X3
(54)
The analytic solution for R is omitted to avoid complications. The farmer
and the smith share the same part of the net product. If X =(8, 3, 2), i.e. the
output of bread is doubled, that of cheese is invariant, and the iron output is
just enough for maintaining the economic flow, R = .37, and the new prices
are:
p1 = 1, p2 =
8∗(2−1−.37)
3∗2 = 0.84, p3 =
8
2 = 4.0; the net product isY =(5, 0, 0),and
its value is p.Y =5.0.
The means of productions of both bread and iron amount to p1+p2+p3 =
1 + .84 + 4.0 = 5. 84, and the income of the two sectors is 5. 84 ∗ .37 = 2. 16.
The income of the shepherd boils down to 1.84 ∗ .37 = 0.68, and the sum of
the three incomes is just 0.68 + 2 ∗ 2.16 = 5.0 = p.Y. The introduction of
iron objects has improved the income of the farmer (from 5/3 = 1.67 to 2.
16 doses of bread), while it has diminished the income of the shepherd (from
5/3 = 1.67 to 0.68).
Unexpectedly, the fortune of the shepherd would rise abruptly if the smith
should produce one more dose. If X =(8, 3, 3), R = .64,Y =(5, 0, 1),p.Y = 7.
67,farmer’s and smith’s income becomes 3. 12, while shepherd’s one rises to
1.41.
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